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Abstract: The article analyses possible interests, attitudes and activities of the major actors in the 
‘natural gas supply game’ in Europe after 1990: Russia/Gazprom, alternative suppliers like 
countries in the Caspian Sea area, the main consumers of gas and transit countries. It stresses that 
behaviour of the actors depends on the changing international political and economic situation and 
conditions in individual countries. Special attention is paid to pipeline projects: Nord Stream, 
South Stream and Nabucco, and reactions to them, such as building a LGN terminal at Świnouj- 
ście (Poland), North-South (Baltic-Adriatic) energy corridor and the Polish-Russian gas contract  
of 2010.  
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1. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
International energy trading is one of the major political issues in contemporary 
Europe. At stake are energy security of energy importers and consumers, big 
profits of energy producers and exporters and of firms related to this activity as 
well as possible political influences exerted by national governments and 
international institutions like the EU. Given technological characteristics of 
natural gas industry and trading: lack of conditions for ‘normal’ competition, 
high dependence on pipelines as the way of transportation (and thus on govern-
mental decisions on their routes), big amounts of capital for investments in 
exploitation of new fields and in transportation and in other infrastructure (e.g. 
in terminals for importing LNG), etc. This sector is especially dependent on 
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governments and thus politicised. The pressure for ‘clean energy’ and reduce-
tion of emission of air pollutants in Europe even more strengthens the impor-
tance of natural gas as a source of primary energy and makes its supply a more 
political issue.  
The intertwining and interplay of money and politics, in other words, of eco-
nomic, technological and political considerations, makes the game of interna-
tional gas trading very unclear. What is especially unclear are long term inten-
tions of some players. A special source of lack of transparency in this issue are 
the changing political relations between the major players resulting from 
developments in activities not related directly to energy trading, such as the 
Russian-Georgian war in 2008, the ‘orange revolution’ in Ukraine in 2004/2005 
and the resulting worsening of political relations between Russia and some EU 
members (first of all Poland), and then the improvement of Polish-Russian 
relations in 2009 and 2010, etc. This changing political climate influences the 
way of perceiving intentions of individual participants of the game by their 
counter partners. Economic instability (e.g. the economic crisis in 2008/2009 
resulting in declining demand in major European markets) and technological 
changes (e.g. increase in shale gas production in the USA in 2010 leading to  
a drop in price for NLG world-wide) add to the instability and complexity of the 
gas trading business.  
In sum, international gas supply in Europe has become a really geopolitical 
game. This article tries to outline some crucial elements in this game. The focus 
is the situation in Poland against the broader background of relations between 
Russia as the main supplier and European countries as consumers of natural gas, 
and the European Union as a rule-setter in the gas trading industry. The paper 
concentrates on developments after 2000, with only a short comment on the 
previous situation. 
2. THE MAIN PLAYERS AND RULES OF THE GAME 
To describe any game it is necessary to present its participants (players) and 
rules of the game. In the geopolitical game for gas trading in Europe it is rather 
difficult to single out the players and to determine rules of the game as these are 
also the subject of the game.  
What concerns the players, the problem is especially Russia and the relation-
ships between its government (in a broader sense including both ‘Kremlin’ and 
the government proper) and Gazprom: to what extent Gazprom is economic 
instrument in geopolitical games of its main shareholder, i.e. the Russian 
government, or vice versa, to what extent the Russian government acts as 
‘political arm’ of Gazprom promoting its economic interests internationally. 
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Given the activities of the government and of Gazprom in recent years, several 
interpretations are possible, and the choice of interpretation to a large extent 
depends on political attitude towards Russia: those who perceive Russia as  
a reliable partner tend to consider Gazprom as a ‘normal’ business company 
pursuing economic goals and interested in its reputation as reliable trading 
partner,1 while those who are afraid of Russia’s imperialist tendencies see 
expansion of Gazprom as a tool in Russia’s foreign neo-imperialist policy.2 For 
instance, interruptions in gas supplies to Belarus and Ukraine by Gaz-
prom/Russia could be interpreted as an economic decision of Gazprom moti-
vated by the necessity to force partners to pay for deliveries (economic interpre-
tation) or as an element in political games of Russia to force these countries to 
political concessions for Russia (political interpretation).  
                                                 
1
 Such an opinion is presented by several German politicians, experts and businessmen (see as an 
example opinion of German expert Roland Götz: ‘Moskau nutzt seine Energie nicht als Waffe’ 
[Moscow does not use its energy as weapon]; ‘Moskau nutzt…’, 2009). A similar opinion is 
expressed by Bernhard Reutersberg, Head of E-ON Ruhrgas in an interview for Süddeutsche 
Zeitung: ‘Russland ist ein zuverlässiger Partner’ [Russia is a reliable partner]; ‘Russland ist...’, 
2009). According to them, Russia is a reliable supplier of energy to Germany and Europe and 
never uses energy as a political weapon: it supplied gas to (West) Germany during the cold war, 
perestoika, collapse of the USSR, times of Yeltsin and Putin. Problems (interruptions in supply of 
Russian gas to Europe in recent years) were due exclusively to others – to the transit countries, 
mainly to Ukraine which did not pay in time for Russian gas and/or was stealing it. According to 
this opinion, Gazprom, although owned mostly by the Russian state, is an independent commercial 
company behaving as a commercial firm in line with wishes of (minority) private – including 
foreign – shareholders. Gazprom does not want and can not use energy supply as political weapon, 
e.g. by stopping supplies or threatening to stop them because it would damage its main asset – 
reputation. This expert is consequent in denying existence of political game played by Russia in 
the area of gas exports – when asked by journalist about Russia’s attempt to create a ‘gas OPEC’ 
with such countries as Venezuela, Iran and Qatar, he downplays these attempts as only  
a meaningless psychological pressure. Accordingly, harmful political game is played by those who 
hinder realisation of Russian projects of Nord Stream and South Stream and force unrealistic 
alternative projects as Nabucco which introduce unnecessary mistrust in the fruitful Russian-
European cooperation. 
2
 This opinion is best represented by Hungarian Tamás Varga (2008). His article relates to Nord 
Stream. According to the author, the idea of building a pipeline directly connecting Russia and 
Germany and bypassing Poland and the Baltic countries has a strictly political significance. It is 
element in Russia’s long term and large scale political strategy. Its main aim is to make Germany 
dependent on Russia (on Russian energy supply and on profits resulting to Germany from its role 
as distribution centre of Russian gas in Europe) and thus to make Germany Russia’s ally or 
assistant, and, at the same time, to ‘draw’ Germany out of the European Union and thus to 
‘neutralise’ the EU as a political player. A secondary aim, fully compatible with the main one, is to 
weaken Poland and the Baltic countries by making them vulnerable to Russian energy blackmail 
(by possible turning off supply of natural gas to them in existing pipelines without affecting 
supplies to Russia’s main partner – Germany). According to this reasoning, it is up to Germany to 
accept the role of Russia’s strategic assistant and ‘neutraliser’ of Europe and Russia’s partner in 
weakening and blackmailing Poland and other countries between Germany and Russia. 
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Anyway, the government of Russia and Gazprom are very important, some-
times and for some even the most important player(s). Regardless of the rela-
tionships between the Russian government and Gazprom, their short and 
medium term interests seem to be common: preserving or strengthening their 
position as a major supplier of gas for European countries, if possible by 
obtaining (preserving) their monopolistic position on the European gas market, 
reducing dependence on transit countries (by direct connections with each 
partner country) and thus imposing as high prices as possible. Controlling gas 
pipelines from Russia to final consumers is also in their interest. These common 
interests enable both Gazprom to gain high profits and the Russian government 
to exert political influence on European countries.  
Other players are governments of Western European countries, first of all of 
Germany, France and Italy, as importers of gas from Russia and from elsewhere. 
Given that imports from Russia is only a part of their gas consumption (not 
exceeding 25%, and even less in their total energy consumption), these 
countries do not feel being dependent on Russian supplies and are not afraid of 
(some) increase in imports from Russia. They are strongly pushed for coopera-
tion with Russia by their firms (so called national champions), both from the 
energy sector and others, interested in doing business in Russia. As a result, 
these governments are ready for cooperation with Russia even while neglecting 
opinions of those countries (including other members of the EU) who may 
object such a cooperation.  
Between Russia and Western Europe are countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe, including Poland. They are both importers and transit countries for Russian 
gas exports. As importers they are highly dependent on Russian gas. Therefore they 
are interested in reducing this dependence, among other things by having access to 
alternative sources of supply, such as imports from the Caspian Sea area, imports of 
LNG, etc. As transit countries they are interested in retaining this position, both for 
economic and political reasons. Poland being on the gas pipeline route form Russia 
to its major customer – Germany hopes that Russia would not ‘turn off’ gas supply 
to Poland because this way it would harm Germany.  
The difference between some Central European countries (like Poland, 
Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia) and Western European countries in their attitudes 
towards Russia results also from their history dating back to the times of Russian 
empire. Therefore the former countries are more inclined than the latter ones to 
interpret Russian decisions as elements of the geopolitical game aimed at 
restoring the empire.3  
                                                 
3
 German analysts Florian Baumann and Georg Simmerl describe in detail differences between EU 
member states resulting from different energy mixes, different dependence on energy imports, 
different geographical sources of imports, different geographical location, role of state and market 
in energy business, etc. In their opinion, these differences create ‘path dependency’ determining, 
for instance, different attitudes to cooperation with Russia (see Baumann and Simmerl, 2011). 
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Of special importance as consumers of Russian gas and transit countries are 
Belarus and Ukraine. Their role in the geopolitical game of gas supply is a part 
of their larger and very complicated political and economic relations with 
Russia, highly dependent on volatile attitude towards Russia, towards their own 
political and economic independence, etc. Generally, they are interested in 
retaining their position as transit countries and in getting economic concessions 
from Russia including reduced prices for Russian gas, if necessary by granting 
Russia political concessions.4  
A special position is taken by the three Northern Baltic countries – Finland, 
Sweden and Denmark – as potential transit countries (for the pipeline on the 
Baltic seabed). Sweden differs from the other two as not being interested in 
imports of Russian gas and being less politically dependent on Russia than, for 
instance, Finland. All the three are interested in preserving natural environment, 
including that of the Baltic Sea, and, at the same time, their firms and local 
governments would not reject contracts with Gazprom in building pipelines and 
fees for exploitation of the pipelines.  
As mentioned earlier, some European countries (and EU institutions) would 
like to diversify sources of gas supply by importing gas from the Caspian Sea 
area. This makes gas producing countries of this area, in first instance Azerbai-
jan, then Turkmenistan and, possibly, Iran as well as the transit countries – 
Georgia and Turkey – players in the game. As regards Azerbaijan and Turk-
menistan, they are interested in getting access also to other markets than Russia. 
For the former it is primarily Europe, for the latter it is China. Russia, in turn, 
would like to take (retain) control of the Caspian gas by importing it from 
Azerbaijan and only then to re-export it to Europe. Azerbaijan does not reject 
Russian competition for its gas as it raises prices but it must not eliminate direct 
contact with European partners, otherwise it would be totally dependent on 
Russia as importer and/or transit country.  
Georgia and Turkey try to make use of their transit position in their economic 
and political bargaining with Europe and the West in general. For the present 
pro-Western leadership of Georgia this role is a way of securing Western 
support for Georgia’s ambitions to join the West.  
Norway being a gas exporter to Europe is another player in the game. Its 
position strengthens after the recent enlargement of its territory in the Arctic Sea 
with possible new gas deposits. As a producer, Norway can be to some extent an 
alternative to Russia.  
Not negligible is the intentional and unintentional role of the United States in 
the European geopolitical gas game. The unintentional role consists in influenc-
ing the global gas market. It can be seen in the recent declining prices of LNG as 
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the result of exploitation of shale gas in the USA and the related reduced global 
demand for LNG. The intentional role of the USA is its political support for 
Georgia. Activity of American firms in searching for shale gas, for instance in 
Poland, is also worth mentioning. 
The last but not least player in the game is the European Union, and espe-
cially the European Commission. The European Commission plays a double role 
– as a regulator of the gas industry in the European Union and as (potential or 
actual) participant in projects, first of all in building infrastructure. Given the 
nature of the EU and the composition of the European Commission, it is not 
clear to what extent the Commission is an independent player and to what extent 
it represents interests of the most influential EU members. It is worth mentioning 
that in the present Commission the commissioner for energy is a German 
national. Nevertheless, the Commission seems to pursue three objectives in  
the gas game: (1) increasing supply (imports) of gas from outside the EU,  
(2) encouraging competition in the European gas market by regulations prevent-
ing monopolies of supply, (3) enhancing energy security by integrating transport 
(pipelines) infrastructure. Apart from the European Commission the European 
Parliament should also be noted as a place where various political opinions are 
presented and thus influencing political climate in the EU.  
While participants of the game are more or less discernible, rules of the game 
are less clear. As mentioned earlier the main source of uncertainty is Russia and 
its intentions, when it became assertive after 2000. Uncertainty about Russia’s 
intentions and possibilities to fulfil them makes that there are various and 
changing interpretations of Russian intentions and attitudes towards Russia 
among European countries, and among individual politicians, businesspersons 
and experts.  
Several propositions as to Russian intentions can be developed: 
1. Russia as a global superpower engaging Europe’s potential. According to 
this proposition, Russia aims at (re)gaining the position of a global superpower, 
equal to the still powerful America and the rising China (and other possible 
global players). To do so Russia needs to harness Europe’s economic, techno-
logical, demographic and cultural (‘soft power’) potential to serve Russian 
global political interests, while marginalising Europe politically and preventing 
it from being another global player. Therefore Russia tends to disunite the 
European Union by picking out ‘good’ and ‘bad’ boys. ‘Good boys’ – countries, 
firms, individual politicians, etc. who can be useful and are ready to be useful in 
the Russian strategy are offered (bought by) economic rewards – contracts, 
positions in Russian-controlled companies, etc. A special role in this strategy is 
ascribed to Germany due to its potential and its position in the EU (the UE 
without Germany can not be a superpower). Making Germany dependent on 
Russia is therefore of paramount importance. The best, if not the only, way to 
make Germany dependent on Russia is to offer Germany and German firms and 
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individuals lucrative contracts and positions, first of all in energy industry 
(Russia has few alternatives outside this sector). The direct gas pipeline from 
Russia to Germany on the Baltic seabed (bypassing transit countries and making 
Germany ‘distribution centre’ or ‘hub’ of Russian gas in Europe) and the related 
contracts and positions are in line with this strategy. ‘Bad boys’ – countries 
which oppose this strategy are punished (by not offering advantageous condi-
tions in mutual trade, by bans on their exports to Russia for ‘sanitary reasons’, if 
necessary by ‘turning off’ the gas tap, etc.). Gas pipelines bypassing the ‘bad 
boys’ can be useful in blackmailing and punishing such countries. Productive in 
this way of policy is also isolating and marginalising the ‘bad boys’ in Europe 
by presenting them (directly or via friendly or hired ‘good boys’) as irresponsi-
ble Russophobes, short-sighted nationalists, etc. Instrumental in this strategy is 
also preventing Europe from access to alternative (non-Russian) sources of 
imports of gas, for instance from the Caspian Sea area.  
2. Russia-Europe strategic partnership. The difference between this strategy 
and the previous one is that Russia admits active political role of Europe as its 
partner and strategic ally. Consequently, it is less interested in disuniting Europe, 
in rewarding some and punishing other countries, in preventing Europe from 
access to the non-Russian sources of energy. The key problem here is to per-
suade Europe to be Russia’s, and not America’s, let alone China’s, strategic ally. 
Offering advantageous cooperation to European countries and firms, according 
to their economic and technological capacity rather than according to ‘divide and 
rule’ political considerations, makes this goal more possible.  
3. Regaining the Soviet empire. Russia is interested first and foremost in 
regaining (or retaining) political and economic control over former Soviet 
republics (possibly except the three Baltic countries already in the EU and 
NATO), first of all over Belarus and Ukraine by preventing their access to the 
Western zone of influence, mainly to NATO. Russia’s policies towards the rest 
of Europe is only a side effect of this strategy. For instance, the main aim of the 
gas pipelines on the Baltic seabed (‘Nord Stream’) and on the Black seabed 
(‘South Stream’) is to bypass Belarus and Ukraine respectively, and thus to exert 
pressure on these countries. That these pipelines bypass Poland or other coun-
tries of Central and Eastern Europe is only a matter of geography. Russian 
military, political and economic activity in the area of Caucasus (including the 
Russian-Georgian war of 2008) is only a result of Russian attempts to secure its 
vulnerable southern regions, to stop Islamist Chechen terrorism and to defend 
Russian citizens in this area, and is a defensive response to provocations by 
others (Chechen rebels, Georgian government, etc.). While trying to re-
gain/retain its control over its ‘near abroad’ Russia is all the time interested in 
retaining mutually beneficial relations with European countries.  
4. Changing or non-existing long term political goals. According to this in-
terpretation, Russia does not pursue a coherent well defined long term foreign 
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policy. This policy is the resultant of changing mood and attitudes of political 
and military leaders, pushed by nationalistic and anti-Western sentiments among 
Russians, tending to restore Russian political might globally or, at least, 
pretending to do so, and interests of the powerful ‘oligarchs’ desiring to 
continue advantageous commercial relations with the West. As regards the 
latter factor, it is worth underlining that the oligarchs keep in the West their 
most valuable assets: their children (most children of oligarchs study in 
Western European countries or America, or simply live there), their property 
(including expensive houses and villas in fashionable resorts) and money (in 
bank accounts). Therefore the last thing they strive to is to break economic 
cooperation between Russia and the West or to worsen Russia – the West 
political relations to the point that the oligarchs can not continue their way of 
life and doing business (selling Russian raw materials to the West and enjoy-
ing living, buying and spending holidays in the West and sending there their 
children). While interested in doing business with the outside world, Russian 
oligarchs (and other businesspeople) tend to create and exploit all opportuni-
ties to force their foreign partners to accept less favourable conditions, for 
instance higher prices for Russian exports, lower fees for exploiting foreign 
infrastructure by Russian firms, higher shares for the Russian partners in joint 
ventures, etc. Instrumental in such a behaviour of Russian businesspeople is, 
among other things, avoiding (bypassing) intermediaries and transit countries 
and making use of their monopolistic position by imposing higher prices to 
their customers. There is a notable exception to this behaviour: it is Belarus 
and Ukraine where political considerations (low, politically determined prices) 
compete with economic consideration (high, world market prices). The 
resultant of political and economic interests depends to a large extent on the 
economic situation in Russia and abroad, first of all on energy prices and 
revenues. In times of rising prices of oil and gas, rising revenues of the 
Russian budget and rising profits of Russian firms, Russia is more inclined to 
pursue the neo-imperialist global policy, while in times of declining prices and 
revenues Russia is better disposed to see its limitations and tends to coopera-
tion with the West, including Europe.  
The choice of interpretation of Russian intentions depends on geopolitical 
and economic situation, and historical experiences of individual countries, on 
political attitudes of persons concerned as well as on the general international 
political climate. 
In comparison with unclear rules of the game played by Russia, the ‘gas 
game’ played by European countries and the EU seems to be clear and simple: 
getting access to Russian gas supplies while avoiding excessive dependence on 
them, and profiting from other forms of cooperation with Russian gas industry. 
In other words, it is an economic game. Politics here is in reactions to Russian 
initiatives.  
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From the point of view of the broader political and economic context in 
which the geopolitical gas game between Russia and Europe takes place,  
the period after 1989/1991 (when the game really began) can be divided into 
three stages: 
1. 1989/1991–2000. Weak and confused Russia, relatively strong Western 
Europe. In this period Russia underwent political, economic and ideological 
crisis. Dramatically declining living conditions of the Russian population, 
growing external indebtedness of the Russian government, collapse of the 
socialist economic and political system and attempts to introduce Western-
style economy and democracy, inexperience of the emerging entrepreneurial 
class all that made Russia highly dependent on the West, including Western 
European countries, as sources of investment capital, credits and advice. For 
the affluent, stable West, Russia was an area of political instability that 
eventually could affect the West, and an area of great opportunities, including 
as location of natural deposits to be exploited by Western firms. The West was 
relatively united and self-confident after the end of the cold war and collapse 
of communism.  
2. 2000−mid-2008. Growing assertiveness of Russia, growing prices of en-
ergy on international markets, confused Europe. The political and economic 
consolidation of Russia under the new leader – Vladimir Putin, growing prices 
of energy and the resulting growing revenues of the Russian budget and rising 
incomes of Russian ‘oligarchs’, paying off external debt and accumulation of  
a huge amount of foreign currency reserves, all that made that both the Russian 
leadership and business became more assertive in relation with Europe (and the 
rest of the world) and felt they could carry out an active long term policy (that 
some called ‘neo-imperialist’ or ‘divide and rule’) towards Europe. At the same 
time Europe, scared by the growing prices of imported energy and insecurity in 
the Middle East, disunited in its attitudes towards the USA (for its wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan and reluctance to accept ‘European values’), confused by the 
enlargement of the EU (in 2004 and 2007) and lacking sense of common goal 
became the weaker player of the geopolitical gas game with Russia. Different 
approaches to Russia appeared among governments, politicians and experts, 
even within one country. While some saw Russia as a counterweight for the 
adventurous USA and a reliable economic partner, others, mostly in Central and 
Eastern Europe, but also in Western Europe, were afraid of the new assertive-
ness of Russia and its policy to use energy as a political instrument, and were 
disappointed for Russian neglect for principles of democracy, state of law, 
freedom of speech, etc.  
3. Since mid-2008 until now (beginning of 2011). Less self-confident Russia, 
more suspicious Europe, both hit the economic crisis. Declining price of energy 
since mid-2008 and the economic crisis of 2008–2009 reduced Russian capacity 
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to carry out assertive foreign policy towards Europe, the crisis itself revealed 
interdependence of Russia and Europe and pushed Russia to cooperate with 
Europe rather than to divide it and reward some and punish other countries. 
The growing power of China also made Russia looking for tighter relations 
(‘strategic partnership’) with Europe. On the other hand the Russian-Georgian 
war in August 2008, recognition by Russia of the break-away regions of 
Georgia (Abkhasia and South Osetia) as well as the prolonged gas conflict of 
Russia with Ukraine at the beginning of 2009 (switching off Russian gas 
supply to Ukraine and further to other countries) all strengthened suspicions in 
Europe as to Russian intentions and made arguments of the ‘Russia-sceptics’ 
in Europe more acceptable. It seems that also Russian society and leadership 
are undergoing a mental transformation from acceptation of authoritarian rule 
in exchange for stability and growing well-being towards a more open, 
democratic and ‘modern’ society. In this context Europe is becoming, again, 
attractive for Russia.  
Behaviour of individual countries in the geopolitical game depended not only 
on the above described general framework, but also on country-specific 
characteristics. In the case of Poland these characteristics consisted, first of all, 
in its attitudes towards the EU, Russia and Ukraine. Since the outbreak of the 
USSR (or even before it) Poland supported independence of Ukraine and its 
democracy considering it as a barrier to re-emergence or expansion Russian 
imperialism and autocracy. This attitude was especially evident during the so-
called orange revolution in Ukraine in 2004/2005. Polish support for Ukraine 
and opposition to the growing influence of Russia in Europe irritated Russia 
and was only half-heartedly backed, if not ignored, by West European coun-
tries. This situation directly influenced positions of all parties in the gas game 
(see below). Possibilities of Poland to influence EU’s stance towards Russia 
and Ukraine were especially reduced in 2005–2007 when Euro-sceptic anti-
Russian and strongly pro-American right-wing parties were in power. The 
situation changed after parliamentary election in Poland in 2007, presidential 
election in Poland in 2010, the change of power in Ukraine and the US-Russia 
‘reset’ by president Obama. In Poland the power was overtaken by pro-
European and more pragmatic in relation to Russia and Ukraine parties. The 
change of power in Ukraine in favour of the pro-Russian party was regarded in 
Poland as the final loss of Ukraine and was received by some in the govern-
ment with relief as opening up new prospects for cooperation with Russia. 
Russian leadership also seems to make use of the new situation by improving 
its relations with Poland, maybe in order to improve its image in Europe or 
recognising Poland’s strengthened role in the EU. This new Russian attitude 
towards Poland manifests itself, however, in symbolical gestures, without 
direct effect on economy, including the gas game.  
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3. ACTIONS AND REACTIONS 
Below are presented some initiatives in the geopolitical gas game between 
Europe and Russia, with special reference to Poland (see figure 1).  
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Fig.1. The main existing and planned gas pipelines and LGN terminals in Central and Eastern 
Europe, Russia and the Caspian Sea area 
 
Yamal I gas pipeline from Russia via Belarus, Poland to Germany proposed 
and built in the 1990s. This was a result of the growing demand for gas, espe-
cially in Germany, and of the necessity for Russia to increase its gas exports to 
earn much needed hard currency. The route of the pipeline was mostly deter-
mined by economic and technical factors as it was the shortest possible and 
easiest to build route from Yamal peninsula (north of the European part of 
Russia) to Poland and Germany. It had also some political significance as it 
diminished dependence of Russian export of gas to Europe on pipelines leading 
through Ukraine, and further through Slovakia, and then westwards to the Czech 
Republic, Austria to Germany or southwards to the Balkans. This dependence on 
the Ukrainian-Slovakian corridor bypassing Poland was, in turn, the result of 
mistrust of Russia to Poland as an unreliable partner in the socialist block in the 
1980s. (It should be added that before building Yamal I Poland imported gas 
from the USSR by some small pipelines crossing the Polish-Soviet border).  
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In the 1990s Polish and Russian governments also agreed upon building Ya-
mal II pipeline, but it never started. At the beginning of the next decade, in  
a new political situation, Russia proposed that Yamal II cross the Byelorussian-
Polish border, then go along the Polish-Ukrainian border to eastern Slovakia 
where it should join the existing pipeline connecting Russia with Central and 
Western Europe. In such a way Yamal II would have bypassed Ukraine. Polish 
government rejected this proposal arguing that there is no sufficient demand for 
gas in south-eastern border areas of Poland and that the building of the pipeline 
would be harmful for the there rich natural environment. Instead, Poland 
suggested that the route of the pipeline should go more to the west, through more 
industrialised and urbanised areas of south-central Poland. This was, in turn, 
rejected by the Russian side. An unofficial, but very important reason for the 
Polish government to reject the original Russian proposal was that it was too 
much provocatively and ostensibly anti-Ukrainian and that its political aim was 
to demonstrate that Poland relinquished Ukraine, its strategic partner, and joined 
Russia. The rejection of the Russian side of building the pipeline in an area more 
distant to the Polish-Ukrainian border confirmed Polish suspicion that the aim of 
the proposal was to provoke a conflict between Poland and Ukraine. 
Nord Steam pipeline connecting Russia with Germany under the Baltic Sea. 
It was agreed by Russian and German governments in 2005. It is theoretically an 
undertaking of commercial firms: Gazprom (majority shareholders with 51% of 
shares), and German firms E-ON Ruhrgas and BASF (jointly 49% of shares). 
Later on Dutch firm Gasunie was admitted with 9% shares conceded by the 
German firms (which now possess 20% each), and France (EdF) also joint the 
project. The pipeline will connect Russian Vyborg (near St. Petersburg) with 
German town Lubmin (near Greifswald) a few kilometers west of the German-
Polish border. Then, it would be divided into two lines: one (called ‘Opal’) 
leading southwards along the German-Polish border to the Czech Republic, and 
the other westwards to the Netherlands, and possibly further. Construction works 
officially started in April 2010, but production and storing of pipes began earlier. 
Now, in February 2011, construction of the Nord Steam is under way. 
The idea of Nord Stream emerged in a specific economic and political at-
mosphere of the first decade of the 21st century: growing prices of energy (oil 
and gas) and perspectives of even greater increase in prices and demand for gas, 
strengthening Russian assertiveness, tensions between the USA and the main 
Western European countries (first of all Germany and France) resulting in 
creation of the Paris–Berlin–Moscow axis and plans to build a gas pipeline from 
the Caspian Sea area to central Europe bypassing Russia called Nabucco (see 
below). The Nord Stream project can be subject to various interpretations. First, 
as a commercial undertaking connecting directly the supplier with its main 
customer bypassing transit countries (in this case Belarus, Poland and Ukraine) 
and making gas deliveries independent on the situation in these countries. 
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Although the short term costs of building this line is higher than costs of  
a possible alternative (on the land, along the Yamal I pipeline through Belarus 
and Poland) long term benefits for the two parties concerned would compensate 
for the initial expenses. The weakening of the position of the transit countries is 
only a side-effect and not a deliberate aim of the project. A second interpretation 
is that the aim, apart from directly connecting Russia with Germany, is to 
weaken the position of Belarus in its relations with Russia. It should be taken 
into account that these relations were quite tense and there were frequent 
conflicts between the two countries over prices of gas, fees for transportation of 
Russian gas via Belarus, overtaking of Byelorussian pipelines and other objects 
by Russian firms, etc. A more radical and political interpretation is that it is 
element of the Russian neo-imperialist strategy and German consent to play the 
role of Russia’s main ally in this strategy.  
The two parties – Russia and Germany – officially declare that it is a com-
mercial undertaking, not aimed at harming any third party, although in analysis 
of the project presented to the broad public opinion its negative impact on third 
countries is usually ignored. Germany also invites Poland to build an intercom-
nector from Germany to Poland, in order to export gas to Poland, and to make 
this undertaking economically viable.  
The European Union approved the project as securing additional imports of 
gas to the UE.  
The idea of building a pipeline under the Baltic Sea raised concerns of gov-
ernments and protests of environmentalists in northern Baltic countries (Finland, 
Sweden and Denmark). (The pipeline bypasses territorial waters and economic 
zones of the southern Baltic countries: Estonia. Latvia, Lithuania and Poland). 
The most suspicious towards the pipeline was Sweden, which, unlike Finland 
and Denmark, could not be persuaded by deliveries of gas from the pipeline as 
Sweden did not need Russian gas. Finally, however, all the three countries gave 
their approval to the project. It should be mentioned that, for instance, Swedish 
firms and local governments are engaged in the project (e.g. by transporting and 
storing the pipes on their territories) and their fishermen are offered substantial 
compensation for the lost income during the construction works, and local 
governments will benefit from transportation fees.  
The Nord Stream project provoked negative reactions in Poland and the three 
Baltic states. It was interpreted as an attempt to circumvent these countries, to 
weaken them by giving Russia possibility to blackmail them by turning off gas 
supply without doing harm to Germany-Russia’s strategic partner. To Poles the 
route of the pipeline – on the bottom of the sea bypassing Poland and then along 
the German-Polish border – resembled very much the Russian proposal of 
Yamal II. As the Yamal II was interpreted as a Russian attempt to drive a wedge 
between Poland and Ukraine and to demonstrate Poland’s neglect for Ukraine, 
Nord Stream was interpreted as a (successful) attempt to drive a wedge between 
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Germany and Poland and to demonstrate that Germany neglected Poland. It also 
revoked historical memories of anti-Polish German-Russian plots in the 18th and 
20th century (e.g. the ill-famous Ribbentrop-Molotov treaty of 1939). Absence 
of any consultation with Poland-Germany’s partner in the EU and NATO – was 
also striking and significant. For the new Polish political elite Nord Stream 
became a lesson of Realpolitik and rules of the game in the EU. 
Polish authorities since 2005, despite changes of persons in the office of 
prime minister and president of the republic, let alone ministers, invariably 
criticize Nord Stream and undertake or consider some reactions. In this regard 
three kinds of ideas can be mentioned: (1) looking for additional, non-Russian, 
supplies of gas, (2) persuading the EU to stop building Nord Stream, or to soften 
its possible negative impact on Poland by introducing solidarity emergency 
mechanism of energy deliveries to countries affected by interruptions in deliver-
ies and/or to introduce other mechanisms in the EU safeguarding interests of gas 
importing countries, (3) ensuring functioning of the Yamal pipeline.  
Among ideas of diversifying sources of gas imports were the recurrent idea 
of importing gas from Norway by a pipeline that should be built between 
Scandinavia and Poland. This proposal, analysed in early 1990s and then after 
the Nord Steam, was finally scrapped as economically not viable (too small 
demand to build a pipeline). Another idea is to import LNG. To do so Polish 
government decided in 2006 to build an LNG terminal. Its location in Świnouj-
ście Port was determined later, and a contract with Qatar for deliveries of LNG 
after the terminal is completed was concluded in 2009. Then the preparation for 
realisation of this project accelerated. The construction of the terminal encoun-
ters some problems that deserves comments. Świnoujście is located in extreme 
north-west of Poland not far from Szczecin and a few kilometers from the 
Polish-German border, and what is especially important, a section of the fairway 
leading to the port is on German territorial waters, in the area where the Nord 
Stream pipeline will be put. According to the construction project of Nord 
Stream, the pipeline will be put just on the sea bottom thus hindering access of 
bigger ships, such as LNG tankers, to the port. Despite appeals of the Polish 
authorities to the German government and to the Nord Stream company to dig in 
the pipes into the sea bottom so that they not block the access to the port, the 
problem until now has not been solved. It seems that German response to Polish 
request in this matter will be a test of German intentions and of its attitudes to 
Poland, and of Poland’s ability to defend its vital interests vis-à-vis Germany.5 
                                                 
5
 Needless to say, that Polish experts often express opinion that the German obstinacy is not an 
accident, but a deliberate action to derail the project. Some experts also hint that the choice of 
Świnoujście was not only not the best one (a better option was port of Gdynia−Gdańsk) but also 
that consulting firms responsible for selection of the location were also engaged in Russia and 
Germany, so they in fact served interests of these countries when choosing Świnoujście which can 
be blocked by Germany. See e.g. ‘Dlaczego Niemcy…’, 2010 (in Polish). 
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The LNG terminal at Świnoujście is to be element of a broader international 
project called ‘North-South gas corridor’ entailing another LNG terminal in 
Croatian island of Krk and a network of pipelines between Poland and Croatia in 
Central Europe (Austria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, and 
Romania besides of Poland and Croatia), for which some interconnectors have 
already been built and others should be built in the near future. To fulfil this idea 
Poland is active in the EU (which otherwise supports building interconnectors as 
an element of creation of the European energy market) and in the Central 
European region (for instance, in the Visegrad Group, an intergovernmental 
consultative body established in early 1990s by Poland, the then Czechoslovakia 
and Hungary, now a lobby group in the EU).6 
Despite its backing for interconnectors, Polish government so far rejects the 
German proposal of building a pipeline from Opal pipeline to Szczecin, and thus 
to export Nord Stream gas to Poland. Accepting this proposal would mean 
accepting the idea of Nord Stream and of the position of Poland as an end-of-
pipe receiver which Poland tries to avoid. Importing Russian gas via Germany 
from Nord Stream would undermine viability of Polish LNG. 
Another possible source of natural gas for Poland is shale and tight gas, and 
in 2010 Poland gave several (altogether 70, including mixed concessions – for 
shale/tight and conventional gas) concessions, mostly to American firms, for 
exploration and exploitation of shale gas (‘70 koncesji …’, 2010). 
In the European Union (European Commission, European Parliament, etc.) 
Poland (the government, Polish MEPs of various orientations) tried to persuade 
the EU to stop Nord Stream or at least to demonstrate that the true motives 
behind this project were far from just supplying gas to Europe, and that it does 
not serve European interests. To do so Poland, together with the three Baltic 
states, planned to submit an alternative pipeline project called ‘Amber’ leading 
from St. Petersburg (in the point where Nord Stream starts) via the Baltic 
countries and Poland to Germany. The aim of submitting this proposal was to 
force the EU to compare the two projects and thus to draw the conclusion that 
Nord Stream was economically, technically and environmentally worse. The 
Amber project was, however, not presented officially to the EC because Latvia, 
in the last moment, withdrew its support, probably not without pressure from the 
pro-Nord Stream lobby. (One of ways of acting of this lobby is offering high 
positions in the Nord Stream corporation, as in the case of the former German 
chancellor Schröder who as chancellor concluded the agreement with Putin and 
who shortly afterwards became president of Nord Stream AG).  
The Polish (and Baltic) campaign to stop Nord Stream in the EU failed, but 
the suspicion as to intentions of the Nord Stream proponents and to the role of 
                                                 
6
 For more on the North-South corridor project see Kublik (2011). 
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Russia and Germany in Europe remained.7 Maybe Russian leader drew the 
conclusion that Poland should not be completely ignored and Russian symboli-
cal gestures to improve relations with Poland after 2008 are a result of such  
a conclusion. At the same time German leaders may have concluded that energy 
matters in the EU should not be left to accidental persons in the Commission and 
proposed their candidate – Günther Öttinger – as commissioner for energy in the 
new EC that took office in 2009.  
Another way of Poland’s action in the EU was to strengthen the solidarity 
emergency mechanism of gas supplies. Despite opposition of such countries like 
Germany and the UK arguing that such a mechanism would distort the function-
ing of the gas market (and not feeling a threat of switching off of gas supplies 
form Russia or elsewhere),8 Poland and other countries managed to introduce the 
idea of energy solidarity to the Lisbon Treaty. This success is, however, incom-
plete, as there are various interpretations of this idea, and there are several 
technical details that should be cleared, as well as technological conditions 
(interconnectors!) must be met to make the idea working.  
                                                 
7
 See for instance opinions expressed by Dieter Helm (2007), professor of energy policy, Oxford 
University. When analysing motives of Russian energy policy he underlines: ‘Its [Russia’s] 
interests are to maximise the economic and political leverage of its energy assets, and this is  
a reality that the EU needs to come to terms with – rather than continue to imagine that Russia will 
adopt an open third-party access regime to its gas pipes and open up its oil and gas reserves to all 
comers’ (p. 2). Describing president Putin’s background as an important factor of Russia’s policy 
the author adds: ‘He developed an affinity to Germany in the process, which has helped in shaping 
the “special relationship” with Germany, and the attempts to use Germany to drive a wedge 
between Poland and the Baltic States, on the one hand, and Germany, on the other’ (p. 20). He also 
denounces attitudes of Germany and France in their dealing with Russia in energy industry, 
especially the Nord Stream pipeline, as detrimental for European interests: ‘The reluctance of 
member governments to allow a similar role for the EU [as in the case of Kyoto protocol, 
reduction of CO2 emissions, etc.] in security of supply matters has already had real costs to the 
EU, and the choice is now between the national interests of the dominant countries – particularly 
Germany and France – and the wider EU interests’ (p. 2), ‘in the case of energy the fear in other 
European countries is that Germany’s national interests in energy are rather different from those of 
Europe as a whole, and the bilateral relationships which Germany has been pursuing with Russia 
are at the expense of the European wider interests. Of all the manifestations of this tension, the 
Baltic Pipeline is the most obvious example’ (p. 35). ‘The Baltic Pipeline not only increases 
Russian power in respect of Ukraine, but it also serves to remind Poland and the Baltic states of 
their historically somewhat precarious position sandwiched between Russia and Germany. […] 
Unsurprisingly, then, there is suspicion that the Baltic Pipeline is a German-Russian enterprise, 
rather than a European-Russian, and a divisive rather than inclusive step’ (p. 36). ‘As noted above, 
the Russian strategy has been to pursue bilateral agreements with individual EU member states, 
against the backdrop of “special relationships” with Germany. In this, it has been largely 
successful. Germany is the Russian hub, with all the strategic, industrial and security benefits that 
follows’ (p. 52).  
8
 On the controversy about solidarity mechanisms in cases of energy supply interruptions see 
Baumann and Simmerl (2011, p. 20). 
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As mentioned earlier, Poland supports EU initiatives aiming at liberalisation 
of the EU energy (in this gas market). One of instruments of this policy is the so 
called ‘unbundling’ – separation of the function of pipeline ownership and 
pipeline operation. According to the EU ‘third energy packet’ approved in 2009 
(to come in force in March 2011) pipeline owners must let independent pipeline 
operators current maintenance and administration, including admitting third 
parties to the pipeline so that there can be competition between gas suppliers. 
This mechanism should prevent monopolies and thus rising prices and black-
mailing customers. Therefore, it defends such countries like Poland from abuses 
of monopolist suppliers. 
Polish support for the unbundling, however, turned out to be in contradiction 
with Poland’s aim to ensure functioning of the Yamal pipeline and securing 
Russian supplies. In 2010, in September, Polish-Russian contract on gas supplies 
expired. Before that Poland and Russia had to conclude a new contract. Polish-
Russian negotiations were protracted and difficult (especially for the Polish 
part). The disputed questions were amounts of gas to be sold to Poland, prices 
for gas, fees for gas transit in Poland (and other issues related to the EuRoPol  
– a Russian-Polish company transporting Russian gas though Poland), time of 
duration of the contract and conditions of functioning of the Yamal pipeline, for 
of all competences of the ‘independent operator’. The Russian side wanted to 
export high amounts for a long period and to have practical control over the 
Yamal pipeline (contrary to the idea of ‘unbundling’). Although Polish negotia-
tors never admitted it publicly, there is impression that the Russian side sug-
gested that after completion of the Nord Stream (and South Stream) Yamal 
pipeline can be switched off. To avoid this perspective Polish government was 
ready to accept conditions proposed by the Russian side. A government 
representative admitted that the contract was ‘in line with the 2nd EU energy 
packet’ implying that was not in accordance with the famous 3rd packet. It 
raised negative comments within Poland and, what is more important, negative 
reactions of the European Commission. EU Commissionaire for energy Günther 
Öttinger came to Poland and warned Polish government from making too big 
concessions to Gazprom and Russia. A process of renegotiation of the contract 
started, this time between three parties: Russia, Poland and the European 
Commission. Paradoxically, the EC, led by a German, tried to prevent too close 
cooperation between Poland and Russia while not long ago it was Poland who 
used to warn against too high dependence of Europe on Russia. Obviously, the 
change in the attitude of the Polish government is determined by the perspective 
of the Nord Stream. Without the Nord Stream Russian negotiators could not 
have blackmailed Poland. The gas contract with Russia is a matter of internal 
disputes in Poland: some oppose it arguing that it will extend Poland’s depend-
ence on Russian gas supply (until 2037), while others, notably the ministry of 
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economy, defend it as securing supplies (until 2037) and functioning of the 
Yamal pipeline.9 
Anyway, the contract makes that Poland will not need to buy Russian gas 
from Germany via Nord Stream. Thus, the contract weakens the position of 
Germany as ‘gas hub’ and as Russia’s ‘special partner’. If this reasoning is 
correct, it would mean that Russia has given up its long-term large-scale 
geopolitical plans to ‘conquer’ Europe with a little help from Germany.  
Nabucco and South Stream. Nabucco is a European pipeline project to bring 
gas from the Caspian area (Azerbaijan, maybe also Turkmenistan, Iraq, Iran) to 
South-Eastern and Central Europe (Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Austria) via 
Georgia and Turkey, this way bypassing Russia. First the idea appeared in 2002 
in an agreement between firms from Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and 
Austria. In 2004 Nabucco Gas Pipeline International GmbH was established by 
the mentioned companies. In 2009 German firm RWE joins the Nabucco Project 
as its shareholder. The same year Nabucco receives blessing of the Europen 
Union and of governments of countries concerned. Construction works should 
start in 2012 and be completed in 2015.10  
The aim of Nabucco is to bring gas to Central and South-East European 
countries and to diminish their dependence on Russia. It can be considered as  
a response both to the growing demand for gas and to the more assertive attitude 
of Russia and fears that Russia can use gas supplies as a political weapon. It 
should be stressed that the process of materialising the Nabucco project is rather 
slow (at least ten years from the agreement to the supposed start of the construc-
tion works) when compared to the Nord Stream (5 years from the agreement to 
the start of the construction). This slowness can be attributed to the relatively 
weak position of the countries engaged and their companies in the European 
Union, doubts as to economic and political viability of the project and a counter-
action of its rival – the South Stream project (below). Access of the German 
RWE in 2009 is of great importance. It seems to illustrate that some German 
politicians and businesspeople share doubts about Russia. It should be remem-
bered that the decision of RWE to join Nabucco was taken after the Russian-
Georgian war in August 2008 and after the January 2009 gas conflict between 
Russia and Ukraine. 
South Stream can be analyzed both as an element in Russia’s coordinated gas 
policy (together with the Nord Stream) and as a response to the Nabucco project. 
South Stream is a joint Russian (Gazprom) and Italian (ENI) venture established 
                                                 
9
 As The Economist puts it: ‘Russia’s new gas contract with Poland could tie that country to 
supplies from the east until 2037. Some Poles like this. Others, chiefly in the foreign ministry, 
think it could jeopardise the country’s plans to develop its own reserves, and to build a terminal to 
import LNG’. See ‘Europe’s Gas Pipelines…’ (2010). 
10
 For more details see: www.nabucco-pipeline.com. 
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in 2007 to transport Russian gas from Russia across the bottom of the Black Sea 
(thus bypassing Ukraine) to Bulgaria, Serbia, Hungary, Austria, Slovenia, 
northern Italy, with possible extension to France, and from Bulgaria to Greece 
and southern Italy. In 2009 the French EdF joint the company (receiving shares 
from ENI). Strong support from Italian government, and then access of France 
strengthens the position of the South Stream, and weakens that of Nabucco 
(Vetturini 2009). 
As can be seen some countries: Bulgaria, Hungary and Austria belong to both 
projects. The problem is to what extent these are competitive and to what extent 
– complementary. It seems that at least governments and experts of the three 
countries consider them as complementary. Nevertheless there is strong lobby-
ing for or against one or another. The most prominent persons engaged in this 
lobbying are two Germans: former chancellor Schröder very actively promoting 
the South Stream and discouraging Nabucco11 and former minister of foreign 
affairs in Schröder’s cabinet, Joschka Fischer, supporting Nabucco.12 
Apart from Nabucco and Southstream there are other projects, too, to bring 
gas to South-Eastern Europe. One of them is AGRI from Azerbaijan to Georgia, 
then after liquefying by tankers across the Black Sea to Romania and then after 
re-gasification by a pipeline to Hungary. As The Economist suggests ‘AGRI will 
not carry as much gas as Nabucco’s planned annual target of 38 bcm. But it 
is cheaper to build […], and will save on Turkish transfer fees. Despite 
noisy political backing, AGRI’s real role is probably to soften Turkey’s 
negotiating stance.’ (‘Europe’s Gas Pipelines…’, 2010). 
As to Poland, it backs the Nabucco project as it complements the aforemen-
tioned North-South European energy corridor (Kublik, 2011). 
4. CONCLUSION 
Energy security in general and natural gas supplies in particular have become  
a political issue in Europe, indeed a geopolitical game in which convergence of 
the general interests of gas suppliers, consumers and transit countries coexists 
with divergence of detailed interests concerning prices of gas, fees for transport, 
conditions of deliveries, routes of pipelines, ownership and control over pipe-
lines, etc. It is also the game where common interests of Europe and Russia in 
                                                 
11
 For instance after Schröder’s visit to Romania one Romanian journal called him ‘Russia’s 
advocate in Romania’, another Romanian journal stated that ‘Moscow spoke German’ (thanks to 
Schröder) (Dobravie, 2008; ‘Moscova vorbeşte…’, 2008). 
12
 See about the conflict between the two former politicians and now commercial lobbyists: 
‘Fischer keilt gegen Schröder…’ (2009). 
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the global system vie for priority with an idea of ‘special relationships’ of Russia 
with some EU countries, notably Germany and France and Italy, at detriment of 
countries of Central-Eastern Europe. Finally, it is a game where the centripetal 
forces of the European Union are confronted with centrifugal interests of its 
individual member states. In this game some actions, undertaken in specific 
economic and political conditions produce reactions in other circumstances 
changing the whole setting. 
From the Polish point of view such an action was first of all the Russian-
German agreement on building the Nord Stream pipeline across the bottom of 
the Baltic Sea bypassing Poland. It was interpreted as dangerous for Polish 
national security. It imbued Polish leaders with a sense of distrust towards 
Germany and the EU which backed the project. As a reaction Polish government 
decided to build LNG terminal in the port of Świnoujście. This, in turn, has 
produced a new problem in the Polish-German relations, namely the above 
mentioned problem of blocking the access to the port by the Nord Stream 
pipeline in German territorial waters. Furthermore, having seen its negotiating 
stance weakened by the perspective of the Nord Stream and of switching off the 
vitally important Yamal pipeline, Polish government decided to accept condi-
tions in the Polish-Russian gas contract in 2010 imposed by the Russian side that 
not entirely comply with EU energy policy and thus provoked tensions in 
relations between Polish government and the European Commission.  
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